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Introduction
Economists have in common a wish to understand what happened and what happens to the many 
aspects of an economy. The history of the name “economics” goes back to Ancient Greece, where 
“oikos” meant household or family estate and “nomos” meant any rule or law or rule of thumb 
which applied to a household.
In this context it has been somewhat surprising to note that current economic analysis seems to 
focus  so strongly on what  governments  do and can do in  their  law making and policy setting 
activities.  A  great  deal  of  thought  has  also  gone  into  the  production  and  consumption  side, 
emphasizing, among others, market behaviour, price setting as well as measuring economic growth.
In my view a rebalancing act is required to conform to to-day’s realities, especially in the developed 
world, which includes the western world plus the newly industrialising countries. In these countries, 
individual households own a multiple of GDP annual output value and an even higher multiple of 
government tax income in a single year. The accumulated savings deserve attention, not just in bank 
deposits, but in houses, in listed or non listed shares in companies and banks, in mutual funds and in 
pension fund reserves. Such attention should not only focus on the actual level of such savings -the 
balance sheet aspect- but also on the question of what kind of return has been achieved -the reward 
for savings-; the income perspective. Income is defined in this paper as the value increase/decrease 
on the stock of savings which was not used for spending in the reporting period.
The second element affecting individual households is the level of liabilities such households enter 
into -again the balance sheet aspect- complemented by the changes therein -the income aspects.
The analysis of the United States economy was chosen for particular reasons: Its economy is the 
largest in the world and secondly the level of its data provision is outstanding as compared to many 
other countries.
In  the  U.S.  the  Federal  Reserve1 publishes  the  Balance  Sheet  of  Households  and  Nonprofit 
Organizations on a quarterly basis.
Per 30th June of this year, the net worth of individual households reached the level of $62.7 trillion, 
GDP level runs at around $15.1 trillion, the U.S. Federal tax income level was $2.4 trillion in the 
last tax year and the U.S government debt level stands at $15.9 trillion.
Even after the substantial losses made by individual households over the period 2008 till now, the 
collective current gearing ratio for all American households is still extremely low. Equity resources 
fund 82.3% of all assets and debt represents “only” 17.7% of funding of the asset base. Compare 
this  to the situation of 1995: equity funded 84.9% of all  assets  and debt covered 15.1% of the 
funding needs of assets. This represents a relatively small shift over a long period of time.
In the period 1995 till  2006 the U.S. economy was able  to  create  an increase in  net  worth of 
individual households of, on average, $3.2 trillion per annum. This study aims to discover why such 
trend line was broken -how come that it was not predicted-; what could have been done to avoid it  
and what are possible options to shorten the adjustment period.
1 http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1r-5.pdf
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1. Was the U.S financial crisis predictable?
At the end of June 2012, the assets of the Individual Households and Noncorporate Organizations 
were $76.1 trillion.  The Households’ real estate level constituted 22.1% of all  assets; consumer 
durable goods 6.3%; short term bank deposits and money market fund shares 11.3%; credit market 
instruments 6.2%; corporate shares and mutual fund shares 18.7%; life insurance reserves 1.5%, 
pension fund reserves 17.9% and equity in noncorporate business 10.1%. Some small items bring 
the total to 100%.
On the liabilities side, which amounted to $13.4 trillion as per same date, 71.2% constituted home 
mortgages and 19.7% was represented by consumer credit. The Federal government debt level has 
been included in the assets under various items, in so far as American individual households have 
funded such debt. On the liabilities side it has not been included, not because it will not be an 
obligation for the individual households to ultimately pay this debt out of their future incomes, but 
because neither the timing of repayments nor the distribution over all taxpayers has been fixed.
For consumer credits -the short term borrowings- the main sources of repayments are the incomes 
of individual households. Doubtful debtor levels are usually covered by bank margins built into the 
lending process, like in the case of credit card lending. In the second main area of consumer credit -  
car financing- in case a consumer fails to repay an outstanding loan, the car can be repossessed and 
sold  on  the  second  hand  car  market.  These  methods  of  financing  have  rarely  lead  to  serious 
problems until 2007. Since 1995, and every year until 2007, there was an increase in the volume of 
consumer loans of roughly $100 billion per annum. Since 2007 and till 30 th June of this year the 
consumer credit volume has stagnated and has only recently shown some kind of growth. However 
after taking inflation levels into account, the consumer credit levels are seriously down as compared 
to the period 1995-2007. The turning point was 2007.
It  has  been  a  different  picture  for  the  long  term  individual  household  debt  levels  -the  home 
mortgage markets-. In the period 1995-2005 the mortgage debt increased in absolute levels from 
$3.3 trillion to $8.9 trillion, an annual average increase of $560 billion. In the five year period of 
end 1999 till end 2005 this average increased to $900 billion annually. In October 2005 the level of 
housing starts was 2.01 million. This monthly figure represents the seasonally adjusted annualised 
level of housing starts. The housing stock of owner occupied dwellings stood at 74.2 million at the 
time, which implies that with the speed of new housing starts the replacement of the total owner 
occupier housing stock would take place in 37 years. One does not know the specific average life 
time of the housing stock, but it is highly unlikely to be anywhere below 60 years and probably a bit 
longer, especially in urban conurbations. The American National Association of Home Builders 
expects newly built homes to last over 100 years. In October 2005 the 30 year fixed rate mortgage 
loan interest level did increase from 5.77% till 6.36%.  With an excessive level of new housing 
starts plus an increase in the costs of mortgages, one may well conclude that the turning point in the 
U.S economic cycle was reached in October 2005. The alarm bells should have started ringing with 
the authorities.
The strong selling pressures by mortgage providers by selling inadequate products, such as 100% of 
home value mortgages, low interest start up mortgages followed by steep interest hikes, no income 
verification and interest only mortgages did push the mortgage lending figures up in 2006 by about 
$1 trillion, but this was no longer followed by home value appreciations to the same extent.  In 
effect home values increased by some $700 billion, which of course made the owners equity as a 
percentage of household real estate drops from 59.6% in 2005 till 56.5%. Even stronger alarm bells 
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should  have  gone off  as  in  the  whole  period  from 1995 till  2005 this  percentage  was  always 
maintained at between 58 and 60%. 
In 2006, the income reward of $700 billion over the savings built up in the homes was no longer  
enough to cover the expenditure level of $1 trillion. This resulted in a loss to households of $300 
billion in the same year. The negative change in housing prices in 2006 was well illustrated in the 
S&P Case Shiller home price index2, which reflected the fact that foreclosure levels were up by 
about 50% in 2006 over 2005 levels. Excessive mortgage selling pressures continued to show up in 
2006 but no action was taken to stop these pressures.
One possible reason why no action was taken is that policy makers generally discuss economic 
progress by watching economic growth figures, which reflect the volume growth in output. In 2006 
the economic growth statistics did show an excellent performance of 3.2% growth. 
What economic growth figures do not show is whether savings have been used effectively in an 
economy. Companies -excluding banks- are the only type of households which strive for profits. 
Their  price setting reflects  market  guidance as to what,  how, how much and for which market 
segment to produce. If unsuccessful they are either taken over or liquidated. The three other major 
types  of  households  -individual  households,  the  government  and  the  banks-  are  all  different. 
Liquidation is not an option for individual households, nor for a government and certainly not for 
the whole banking sector.
 The U.S government’s role is reflected in its expenditure pattern. In fiscal year 2011 24% of its 
costs were for Health and Human Services, 21% for Social Security purposes, 21% for Defense, 5% 
for Veteran Affairs, 7% for interest payments over government securities held by the public and 
23% for all other costs. All these purposes carry a cost, but none of them were incurred with a profit 
motive in mind. 
The second main type of households is the collective of individual households. Their main drive is 
to earn an income -have a job during their working life-. Their income depends on the level of job 
opportunities, on the return over their savings levels, on the prices they have to pay out of their 
incomes for goods and services, on the prices of financial borrowings and on the governments’ tax 
regime. Individual households do not control any of these factors, they may hope for good results, 
but they do not control the process as companies do. 
Finally the banks: banks are risk intermediaries between funding and lending. They basically strive 
to maximise the intermediation fees between the funding and lending cash flows -and derivatives 
there off-. Banks’ intermediation can be a force for good like in the period 1995-2004, but it can 
also  collectively  lead  to  excesses.  Sometimes  such  excesses  are  forced  upon  companies  when 
takeovers  take  place  and  companies  are  forced  to  accept  much  higher  gearing  ratios.  Often  it 
involves the individual households especially through long tem lending for home mortgages and 
share introductions to a stock exchange. Finally it can lead to excesses in lending to governments to 
fund their expenditure levels.
The  conclusion  is  that  GDP  output  is  a  result  of  the  interactions  between  different  types  of 
households rather than the cause. The causes of economic cycles are to be found in the use of funds  
and their efficient or inefficient applications. The profit motive only applies to the corporate sector 
but not to a government or individual households. The banking sector constitutes a separate type of 
2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Case-Shiller_index.png
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household as its only “product” is money. Current economic difficulties around the world can be 
attributed to the use of funds for individual households and/or for funding government deficits.
The U.S government did not go on a spending spree in 2005 or 2006; it did not cause the crisis. The 
collective U.S banking sector did this in relation to individual households. Some banks behaved 
prudently and others very imprudently. To reach total lending levels to one type of households is - 
perhaps regretfully- a collective activity. Collectively speaking, bank’ risk management activities 
over the period 2005 till to-day leaves much to be desired.
The  lending  excesses  were  further  encouraged  through  the  securitisation  process  of  home 
mortgages. Such a securitisation process broke up the bank-client relationship and also introduced 
the  impression  that  long  term  mortgage  debt  could  be  liquidated  on  a  daily  basis.  American 
investment  banks,  helped  by  the  credit  rating  agencies,  promised  to  maintain  a  market  in  the 
Collateralised Mortgage Obligations (CDO’s) markets. This was a banker’s promise they did not 
keep and in 2008 the CDO markets collapsed. A liquidity crisis occurred affecting not only the U.S 
but also all international banks that had either bought CDO’s or themselves had issued CDO’s such 
as Northern Rock in the U.K. What started as an individual borrower’s cash crisis, the securitisation 
process turned it into a full blown liquidity crisis. The borrower’s cash crisis in itself affected all  
home owners; the subsequent liquidity crisis affected all home owners plus all investors in CDO’s. 
Such investors included many foreign banks. The derivatives markets spread their tentacles even 
further and as a consequence no bank was sure what other banking organisations were holding in 
doubtful risk products. They stopped funding each other. This led to a full blown banking crisis 
followed by an economic crisis and a government debt crisis.
The investors in CDO’s may have been naïve in putting their trust in U.S investment banks; but one 
should emphasize that for many years the banking business was build on “trust” and “trust” alone 
plus common sense in knowing one’s client base. Depositors trust the banks, so do bondholders and 
shareholders. If “trust” can no longer be relied upon than the very existence of the banking sector 
needs to be revisited. The government authorities, whose job it is to supervise the banks, failed to 
predict that a liquidity crisis could be created by issuing CDO’s on a large scale.
The conclusion out of the above is that the starting points of the economic turn around happened in 
October 2005; it became subsequently clear in 2006 that the additional funds pumped into the home 
mortgage market did not cause the value of the housing stock to increase with the same amount or 
more. The use of borrowed funds to the individual households became less efficient, home owners 
had gotten funds they could not afford to repay - an economic waste.
The warning signs were there and the crisis could have been predicted. The excessive focus on GDP 
output figures was probably to blame.
2 Was the financial crisis avoidable?
The financial crisis led to five types of actions and one reaction, which all six together have slowed 
down the period of adjustments. They are:
• Individual households reacted to the financial crisis by paying down their mortgage levels 
over the period end of 2007 to end of 2011 by an annual amount of $200 billion. This effect 
plus  the  fact  that  in  “normal”  years  about  $700  billion  would  have  been  taken  up  in 
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additional mortgage loans, reduced disposable incomes for other purposes with some $900 
billion for each year from 2008 to the current. An annual negative growth effect of 5.6%.
• The “softening” of mortgage conditions has been clearly spelled out in a Deutsche Bank 
study3.  37%  of  the  “subprime”  mortgages  were  interest  only  mortgages  without  any 
obligation  to  repay  principal  amounts;  38%  were  100%  mortgages  requiring  no  down 
payment; in 43% of the mortgages no income check was made and in 80% of the mortgages 
a low start up interest rate was included for a period of two years after which period a steep 
hike in interest rates was applied. These mortgage conditions shift the risks away from an 
income related lending programme to an asset -home- financing, whereby the expectation 
was for a strongly increasing average home price.
• The  mortgage  lenders  ultimately  had  to  rely  on  the  asset  values  once  CDO  holders 
collectively wanted to get out of the mortgage risks. This set in motion a second hand house 
sale program, the U.S had never experienced before. In the period 2007 to and including 
2011 about  4.4 million  “second hand” homes  were  dumped  on the  market,  on  average 
880000 per year. Such an extra supply puts tremendous pressure on prevailing house prices. 
On average each American home owner lost about $ 84 000 from the average house price of 
$  289  000  per  end  2006;  a  29%  loss.  Selling  individual  homes  -  the  asset  base  of 
individuals- distorted not only the home prices for the 5.5% doubtful debtors, but for all 
78.6 million  home owners.  Also new home starts  felt  the  effects.  In January 2009 new 
housing starts dropped to 490 000. The replacement ratio of new building versus housing 
stock  dropped  to  167  years.  House  prices  were  totally  driven  by  “irrational”  financial 
markets rather than by real markets supply and demand.
• The whole system of mortgage lending was undermined by these effects. Fanny Mae and 
Freddy  Mac’s  important  roles  in  the  mortgage  lending  markets  totally  stalled  as  their 
Mortgage  Backed  securities  holders  expected  payments  and  some  mortgagees  were  not 
paying  off  their  obligations.  The  U.S  Government  had  to  come  to  the  rescue  in  2008. 
However Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac’s current involvement with new mortgages has risen 
to 95% of all new mortgages granted.
• The negative and low economic growth levels also had other side effects. The value of the 
individual household’s balance sheet item of shares in listed and noncorporate businesses 
dropped by 13.9% over  the  period  December  2007 to  December  2011.  Interest  income 
levels over government bonds also dropped from 4.8% to 1.7% this year. This was partly 
caused by “quantitative easing” activities of the Fed, which bought up such securities. The 
risks for the individual households over the outstanding government debt did change as the 
level of debt increased rapidly over the last five years -for reasons beyond the government’s 
control-, but both the interest rate and the interest amounts paid to such households dropped 
as an important share of the debt was taken out of the market. Such effect created another 
negative  income element  for individual  households at  a time when all  income increases 
would have been welcome.
• As a consequence of these financial  and economic factors the unemployment  rates  rose 
sharply.  The  latest  figures  of  October  2012  showed  that  7.9%  of  the  labour  force  is 
unemployed. This represents 12.3 million Americans. Youth (16-24) unemployment levels 
are much higher. Their percentage is 16.4% or in number terms 3.25 million young people. 
3 http://www.globalsecuritisation.com/08_gbp/gbp_gssf08_022_031_db_us_subprm.pdf
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If individuals cannot find a job, they can also not contribute to economic growth. Young 
people  spend  a  high  percentage  of  their  incomes  on  consumption;  therefore  their 
unemployment status reduces the overall level of consumption power. Of course the income 
generation from the other 9 million Americans is also sorely missed.
3. How can the adjustment period be shortened? Possible Balance Sheet solutions
Over the period 1995 to 2006 the net worth of the American individual households increased 
annually with on average $3.2 trillion per annum. Such an amount represents the Annual Profit 
or one could also call it the Country’s Profit level. To return to such income earning situation a 
few changes may be needed in the American economic system - the “econ”system. Such a 
system reflects the interactions of the various types of households in a society.
Apart from some changes in the way that the home mortgage markets operate, it may also be 
appropriate to investigate whether a balance sheet item could be found which allows a quick 
conversion of a small part of it into cash in order to create purchasing power until economic 
growth  levels  have  reached  their  optimum level  ensuring  as  high  an  employment  level  as 
possible. Once such cash injection has done its work it could be reconverted back into savings 
out a small part of future tax receipts -such receipts increase with the level of economic growth-. 
Another gain should be expected on shares as economic growth rates pick up; some of these 
income gains can also be used to offset the pension dividend,
These  suggestions  have  extensively  been  dealt  with  in  a  recent  article4.  A  short  summary 
hereby:
• The mortgage products need to be revised with an emphasis on shared risks between the 
lenders and the borrowers. The shared risk taking should include a down payment and a 
savings element by the borrower; it should avoid transferring interest rate risks to the 
borrowers; it should be based on an active income assessment process and not rely on 
self-certification of income level. Interest only mortgages rely too strongly on positive 
house price movements and should therefore be banned. The main priority should be that 
home mortgages need to be met out of incomes rather than out of liquidating the asset.
• Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac have outstanding capabilities in funding mortgages as their 
organisations are government related. They could attract long term fixed rate funds at the 
lowest costs. Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac do not have the same capacity as commercial 
banks in judging income risks on individual borrowers. This function is best left to the 
commercial banks. The distribution of functions could be that commercial banks take on 
the credit risks on the borrowers and provide a guarantee for the funding as provided by 
Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac.
• It is unclear why bank supervisors attach such great importance to the balance sheet of 
banks rather  than  to  the  profit  and loss  levels.  After  all  banking risks  are  based on 
receiving a higher risk premium for the risks taken than for paying out for the funds 
attracted. Risk taking is an income based business. Banks do not need large capital bases 
as their businesses do not require sizeable amounts for capital goods investment. Bank 
offices  and  computers  can  be  leased.  If  shareholders  were  paid  a  fixed  reward  for 
providing funds to a bank, thereby turning share capital into perpetual notes, than the 
4 http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/42580/
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quality of bank risk taking would improve for the simple reason that managements’ risk 
taking capabilities would be reflected in the perpetual note price at stock exchanges. The 
way bank shares are currently used mixes up the income and the balance sheet role. In 
good  times  shareholders  get  an  income  plus  an  appreciation  of  share  values.  Such 
appreciation of shares is not reflected in bank balance sheets but only in the shareholders 
balance sheets. In bad times shareholders do not get an income and see a depreciation of 
their shares. This time it is reflected in the balance sheet of banks by writing down the 
bank share values for loan losses made. If the income and the balance sheet objectives 
were separated and incomes were paid at a fixed rate to “shareholders equal perpetual 
note holders” than the best managed banks would see their perpetual notes values remain 
at 100% - in other words poor risks were foreseen and provided for out of reserves- (see 
also next point).  Poor managements should be forced to attract more perpetual notes at a 
higher  interest  rate.  Excellent  managements  do  not  need  to  increase  the  level  of 
perpetual notes. It is not the size of the assets of a bank, neither the size of the share 
capital buffer which matters, but the ability of banks to manage its risks. Splitting up the 
income from the balance sheet  side will  show which banks do better  or worse than 
others.
• Bank  risk  taking  should  also  be  better  reflected  in  their  Balance  Sheets  and  P/L 
accounts.  Taking  into  account  that  each  risk  taken  can  lead  to  a  potential  loss,  an 
economic balance sheet and p/l account could be established for all types of banks. From 
the moment a risk enters the books of a bank a percentage of the income should be 
reserved for future losses. If, with the right kind of products, such reserve pots would 
have been established for the commercial banks,  the losses on doubtful debtors in the 
mortgage markets would have been much lower and could have been met out of reserves 
rather than liquidating the assets. Only in extreme cases repossession of the property 
should have been the final threat. For investment banks, such reserve pots would have 
needed to be substantially higher as they were selling long term risks with the chance of 
creating a liquidity crisis.  They also would have needed to pay their  perpetual  bond 
holders a higher annual interest rate than commercial banks.
• Bank supervisors could be given the role of appointing independent auditors, to be paid 
for by the banks, but reporting to the Fed and other regulatory authorities, For home 
mortgages it is worthwhile to consider whether Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac could be 
jointly given authority to regulate the collective level of mortgage lending as this was the 
key issue which went wrong in the last crisis.
• The last suggestion is related to shortening the period of adjustment. This crisis has now 
lasted five years.  The U.S economy does not lack savings, what it  currently lacks is 
purchasing power.  The U.S government  has not got such savings,  but the individual 
households do. The suggestion is to temporarily turn a small part of such savings into 
cash. Such method can be called “economic easing”. The most logical category of funds 
is the pension fund reserves. A pension fund dividend could be paid out to all pension 
savers and pension beneficiaries. If an equal amount would be paid out for all pension 
fund members, such pay out would achieve two goals. The first one is that many young 
people saving for a pension would get a cash injection on top of their income; they are  
the most likely group to spend it, but they are simultaneously the group which is faced 
with the longest period of investment risks. The second one is that such a system would 
support  the  philosophy  of  saving  for  a  funded  pension  plan.  Of  course  all  pension 
dividend beneficiaries should be encouraged to spend rather than save the amount. Such 
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exercise could be repeated till economic growth has reached its optimal level. Pension 
funds benefit  from the share price increases;  employment  levels benefit  as increased 
capacity  will  be set  up; the government  will  benefit  through higher  tax receipts  and 
banks  will  benefit  from lower  levels  of  risks  on  both  the  corporate  as  well  as  the 
individual  households.  Once the  growth rate  is  up,  the transfer  back from cash into 
pension savings can be accommodated partly from increased government revenues and 
partly from increased share prices.
If the will is there, there is always a way to achieve one’s goals.
Drs Kees de Koning
28th November 2012 
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